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We document dramatic rising wages in China for the period 1978-2007 based on multiple 
sources of aggregate statistics. Although real wages increased seven-fold during the period, 
growth was uneven across ownership types, industries and regions. Since the late 1990s, the 
wages of state-owned enterprises have increased rapidly and wage disparities between skill-
intensive and labor-intensive industries have widened. Comparisons of international data 
show that China’s manufacturing wage has already converged to that of Asian emerging 
markets, but China still enjoys enormous labor cost advantages over its neighboring 
developed economies. Our analysis suggests that China’s wage growth will stabilize to a 
moderate pace in the near future. 
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Rising Wages: Has China Lost Its Global Labor Advantage? 
 
I.  Introduction  
In the past decade, China’s emergence as the workshop of the world and as the largest 
receiver of foreign direct investment (FDI) has profoundly influenced global trade patterns 
and the competitive landscape. The impetus for these successes stems in large part from 
China’s comparatively low wages for workers. However, Chinese wages have risen sharply 
with globalization; average real wages more than tripled in the ten years from 1997 to 2007, 
according to published government data. Since soaring wages may eventually erode one of 
China’s most prominent global economic advantages, its low labor costs, this phenomenon 
has drawn increasing attention from social scientists, policy makers and the public. Two 
recent studies by Chinese academic institutions sound the alarm on issues concerning China’s 
labor market conditions. The Institute of Population and Labor Economics at the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), in its Green Book on Population and Labor 2007, 
predicted that China will reach a “Lewisian turning point,” where rural surplus labor is 
depleted to such a level that continuing industrialization cannot be supported cheaply (Cai, 
2007). Independently, the Development Research Center of the State Council, in a 2007 
survey covering 2749 villages, also proclaimed that three-quarters of villages have no 
suitable young labor remaining to transfer from agriculture into other sectors. Both studies 
forecasted severe labor shortages and an acceleration of wage rises in China, starting as early 
as 2009 or 2010. 
Anxiety over rising labor costs in China has also spread to international advisory and 
business communities. Recent reports have warned that China is starting to lose its luster as a   2
manufacturing base for exports.
1 Similar dispatches note that since accelerated wage growth 
squeezes the margins of multinational corporations (MNCs), the conditions for FDI in China 
are deteriorating relative to other emerging economies in Asia.
2  Yet, despite the prominence 
of such narratives, there remains little systematic documentation on the extent and scope of 
rising wages in China. There is also a dearth of reliable information on how wages in China 
compare with levels in other emerging and advanced economies. 
  This paper seeks to fill this gap by documenting systematically the changes in the 
structure of wages in China for the period 1978-2007 and by comparing China’s wage levels 
with its neighboring Asian economies. Our analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we provide 
a careful analysis of China’s changing wage levels over time across major industries, 
ownership categories and geographic locations by compiling and adjusting aggregate 
statistics from many different published sources. We show that, though it is true that real 
wage has increased seven-fold in the past three decades, the growth has been uneven. Wages 
of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have increased rapidly in the past decade, currently surpassing 
the level of the non-public sector, and wage disparities between skill-intensive and labor-intensive 
                                                 
1  An article in BusinessWeek (March 27, 2006) notes that corporations and suppliers are beginning to look for 
more profitable options, including countries such as Vietnam or Indonesia. The Economist (January 11, 2007) 
notes that pay for factory workers has been rising at “double-digit rates for several years.” The New York Times 
(August 29, 2007) profiles a number of factory managers having difficulty finding workers and dealing with 
wage rises. 
2  Rising labor costs has been one of the important reasons that forced thousands of small and medium 
manufacturing firms in Guangdong province to cease production, go bankrupt, or relocate to other regions with 
more desirable operating conditions in the past one to two years. Guangdong accounts for roughly one third of 
China’s total export. The Economist (January 11, 2007) notes spiraling costs mean that firms are searching for 
better investments elsewhere in Asia, including Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam. The Japanese External Trade 
Organization has encouraged companies with a China-Plus-One Strategy to consider strengthening their policy 
towards the “Plus One” (JETRO, 2006).   3
industries and between geographic regions in China, which began to appear in the 1990s, have 
widened considerably. 
  Secondly, we utilize data sources from the International Labor Organization (ILO) and 
the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) to construct 
internationally comparable time series of manufacturing wages of China and ten neighboring 
economies and regions in Asia. These two independent statistical sources complement each 
other by demonstrating consistent trends in cross-country wage comparisons, in ways that 
have not been attempted previously. Although China’s manufacturing wage has grown faster 
than its neighbors, its wage level is only just beginning to be competitive with other 
developing countries in the region. China continues to enjoy enormous cost clout advantages 
over more developed economies, as its wage level is, on average, still only about 7 to 21% of 
economies  such  as  Japan  and  Hong  Kong.           
Thirdly, we analyze the demand and supply conditions for skilled and unskilled labor in 
China covering the periods before and after the outbreak of the current economic crisis. 
Overall, our views are less pessimistic than the studies discussed earlier: wage growth for 
unskilled labor will be moderate due to the potentially large supply of workers, made up of 
workers from the rural sector and employees who were laid off as a result of state-sector 
restructuring. Wage growth for skilled labor will also likely taper off because of the 
convergence of college wage premiums to international standards in recent years and the 
anticipated robust supply of university graduates and returned professionals from overseas. 
We conclude that China will still maintain its competitive edge in low labor cost in the near 
future.   4
  The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 analyzes wage trends within China, while 
Section 3 consolidates international data and compares China’s manufacturing wage levels 
with its Asian neighbors. Section 4 presents a demand and supply analysis of China’s markets 
for skilled and unskilled labor, shedding light on the likely development of wage trends in the 
near future. Section 5 concludes with a brief assessment of the impact of current economic 
crisis on unemployment and wages in China.   
 
II. Changes in China’s Wage Structures, 1978-2007 
A. Data and Related Literature 
Profound socioeconomic transformations, including massive privatization, industrial 
structural changes and regional development, have occurred in China since the inception of 
reforms in 1978. China’s wage structures have evolved accordingly, exhibiting major 
changes across ownership categories, industries and regions over three decades. These 
changes have implications for both its domestic economy and international competitive 
landscape. In analyses of the world’s largest manufacturing workforce, Banister (2005) and 
Lett and Banister (2006) estimate China’s manufacturing earnings and compensation for the 
period 2002–2004, based on published data from various editions of the China Labor 
Statistical Yearbook and the China Village and Town Enterprise Yearbook. To gauge time 
trends in manufacturing earnings, Banister (2005) presents earnings of staff and workers for 
the manufacturing sector covering the period 1990–2002. They also assess the quality of 
China’s statistics on manufacturing earnings, and for 2002, with estimates available for both 
the urban and rural labor force, they compare China’s manufacturing compensation with 
wages levels observed for the newly industrialized economies in Asia and several other   5
developing and developed economies and regions. To our knowledge, these are the only 
papers that systematically document aggregate wage trends in China; even these, however, 
have coverage limited to the manufacturing sector and to selected years and periods.   
        The recent burgeoning literature on income inequality and labor markets has explored 
the determination of labor earnings during transition, with an emphasis on microeconomic 
economic behavior for selected years. Two widely used household data sets are the China 
Household Income Project (CHIP) and the Urban Household Survey (UHS)—the former has 
three waves of surveys with data for 1988, 1995 and 2002, while UHS data covers annual 
cross-sectional information since the late 1980s.
3  Economists have employed the data for 
studying topics such as returns to education (e.g., Liu, 1998; Li 2001; Fleisher et al. 2005; 
Zhang et. al. 2005; Yang, 2005), income inequality (e.g. Gustafsson et al. 2008), and the 
gender earning gap (e.g., Knight and Song 2003). Varying with individual projects, 
informative statistics on changes in wage levels and employment structures are presented for 
selected years and subgroups of the workforce, but there has been no documentation of broad 
changes in wage trends and employment structures. The paucity of studies on China’s wage 
trends reflects in part the lack of systematic, consistent aggregate data that cover wages and 
labor compensation over a wide basis and an extended period of time.   
This paper undertakes the task of constructing and presenting general patterns of urban 
real wages for China by provinces, by ownership types and by industries for the period 
1978-2007, with a larger scope to the question than previous research. The paper concentrates 
                                                 
3  Although UHS is an annual survey running more than twenty years, due to various restrictions on data usage 
from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), researchers have only had access to UHS data for a limited 
number of provinces in selected years.   6
its energies on the checking and integrating of various data sources, ensuring consistency of 
data reporting, and adjusting changes in variable definitions, resulting in a broad description 
of wage trends in China. More specifically, we rely primarily on several major published 
sources of aggregate statistics for China, including China Statistical Yearbooks, wage series 
from CEIC Data Company, Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials on 55 Years of 
New China (NBSb, 2004) and the China Labor Statistical Yearbooks. Wage statistics, and 
information needed to compute the changes of real wages over time, such as consumer prices 
indices (CPI) and total employment numbers are scattered and inconsistently reported in 
these sources of China’s aggregate statistical data. Our goal is to assemble all related 
information and construct a clean and unique set of wage data using China Statistical 
Yearbook, CEIC and 55 Years to mark the changing trends of wages across ownership types, 
geographic locations and major industries since the inception of the economic reform in 1978 
up through 2007, the most recent year with available data. We have posted a 
not-for-publication data appendix, which includes data sources, definitions, adjustments made 
and original data tables, at http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/eco/staff/dyang/Data-Appendix.doc. 
The wage and employment information used in the paper are based primarily on the 
Comprehensive Labor Statistics Reporting System of the NBS, which covers all independent 
accounting units and relies on complete enumeration and reporting from lower levels to 
higher levels of work units (NBSa, 2008). The term “work unit” denotes corporate enterprises 
and all non-enterprise units, such as government departments or administrative agencies, but 
excludes township enterprises, private units or self-employed business. The secondary data 
source is the Sample Survey on the Population Change, which contains information on the   7
employment status and occupations of the population aged 16 and above for the whole 
country.  
    Wages  in  this  paper  refer  to  labor earnings for staff and workers (zhigong), which are 
“formal employment” comprising all laborers receiving payments and being employed by (a) 
state-owned units, (b) urban collectively owned units, (c) joint operation units, (d) limited 
liability companies and stock companies, (e) foreign-owned units, (f) units with investment 
from persons in Hong Kong, Macao, or Taiwan, or (g) units subordinate to one or more of the 
above units.
4  Therefore, by definition, staff and workers are employed in cities, and they 
constitute more than 95% of total employment in formal urban units over the selected years 
(Holz, 2006). Presumably they also include rural migrant workers employed in the (a)-(g) 
types  of  work  units.     
Total wages or earnings refer to the total remuneration payment to staff and workers 
during a period of a year (NBSa, 2008). They include all types of payments in money or in 
kind, including salaries paid for fixed time periods and other payments based on piece work, 
bonuses, allowances, subsidies, overtime pay, and extra pay for working under hazardous and 
dangerous conditions. Total wages are not equivalent to total labor compensation, a measure 
often used in international comparisons, which also includes pension contributions and social 
insurance payments that employers are required to pay to city governments on behalf of their 
employees or welfare fund payments such as employer contributions to housing funds, which 
                                                 
4  Hence, the term staff and workers exclude persons (a) employed in township and village enterprises, (b) 
working in individual/private enterprises, (c) urban self-employed persons, (d) retirees, (e) re-employed retirees, 
(f) teachers working in informal schools, (g) foreigners and persons from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan who 
work in urban units, and (h) other persons not to be included by relevant regulations.   8
are given to employees in the enterprises. We apply provincial level urban CPI to adjust 
nominal wage levels to real wages in 2007 Yuan
5.  
 
B. Wages by Ownership 
Between 1978 and 2007, the average real annual wage for staff and workers grew more than 
sevenfold from 3,285 to 24,932 Yuan, as Figure 1 shows. Influenced by three distinctive 
phases of reforms, wage growth exhibits systematic paths. Before 1985, the year considered 
as the beginning of major urban reforms, average wage growth was moderate, rising at a rate 
of 4.9% per year. In the period 1986-1997, when employment in private, jointly-owned 
enterprises in other ownership categories experienced vigorous growth, nationwide wage 
growth was still at a modest rate of 3.9%, which was influenced in part by two consecutive 
years of negative growth in 1988 and 1989 because of high inflation and political upheaval. 
In the period 1998-2007, wage growth accelerated to an astonishing 13.2%. This period of 
wage explosion coincided with China’s preparation for and accession into the WTO, as well 
as the major restructuring of SOEs that started in 1998.       
A remarkable feature emerges from data trends documented in Figure 1. The average 
wage of SOEs, while lagging significantly behind that of the private sector—mostly 
consisting of domestic stock holding firms, joint ventures, and foreign firms—throughout the 
1990s, grew rapidly after 1998 and actually overtook those of private enterprises in 2003. 
Throughout the 1990s, the wage level in the private sector was on average 31% higher than 
state-sector wages. During this period, many talents were lured away from the state sector to 
                                                 
5  According to DataStream, in 2007, the average exchange rate was 7.452 Yuan (Chinese currency) to 1 U.S. 
Dollar. This is the nominal exchange rate we will use for international wage comparisons. 
   9
work for joint ventures and foreign firms because of their superior labor compensation, a 
phenomenon known in China as “jumping into the sea.” But wages in the state sector began 
to increase sharply in the late 1990s, reaching 16,227 Yuan in 2003, surpassing private sector 
wages by a narrow margin for the first time since reform began. By 2007, the average wage 
in the state sector was about 11% higher than that of the private sector. Indeed, domestic 
Chinese firms have become more competitive, offering high wages to attract talents back 
from joint-venture and foreign firms. A new phrase—“coming back to shore”— has been 
coined to refer to the phenomenon that Chinese professionals working in joint-venture and 
foreign firms have felt strong incentives luring them to work for domestic companies.   
  State sector restructuring has underpinned the dramatic rise in state sector wages. Under 
China’s planned economy, SOEs had low productivity, limited profits, high debt burdens and 
disguised unemployment, because of the SOE’s important political function of maintaining 
low unemployment and ensuring social stability (see e.g. Dong and Putterman, 2003). The 
government set wages in SOEs based on a wage grid system that was dependent on seniority 
instead of performance.
6  By the mid-1990s, the Chinese government realized that their 
gradualist reform policy could no longer manage the mounting losses of SOEs and decided to 
take more aggressive steps, first allowing the privatization of small and medium SOEs and 
then, beginning in 1997, moving forward with more aggressive restructuring. The objective 
was to shut down loss-making SOEs, establish modern forms of corporate governance, and 
de-link the provision of social services from individual employers. This would be 
                                                 
6  Administrative personnel were put into 20 salary grades, technicians and staff into 17 grades, and manual 
workers into 8 grades. Detailed wage tables explicitly set wage payments in each grade. There were minimum 
regional variations to adjust costs of living and variations across industries to reflect factors such as demand 
conditions. See Meng (2000) and Knight and Song (2003) for descriptions of wage systems under planning.     10
accomplished through privatizing housing and shifting the federal responsibility of health 
insurance, unemployment insurance and pension provisions into the joint responsibilities of 
local governments, employers and employees themselves. These aggressive reforms led to 
mass layoffs in SOEs. From 1996 to 2002, about 40 million workers were laid off, including 
32 million from the state sector. The massive exodus of the least efficient workers provided a 
burst of vitality to the state sector. Using industrial firm-level data, Deng et al. (2007) find 
that labor productivity at SOEs tripled from 1995 to 2003, with more than 34% of 
productivity growth attributable to substantial job elimination. Substantial gains in 
productivity enabled the state sector to raise wages of their workers.
7 
However, restructuring has led to mounting unemployment among urban workers. Based 
on the 2001 China Urban Labor Survey and the 2000 Population Census, Giles et al. (2005) 
estimated that the unemployment rate of urban permanent residents increased from 6.1% in 
1996 to 11.1% in 2002. Using independent population data sources, Knight and Xue (2006) 
have arrived at similar estimates that China’s urban unemployment rate increased gradually 
from 7.7% in 1995 to 11.5% in 2000. Unemployment was widespread, hitting older workers, 
women and those with less education particularly hard (Giles et al. 2006). In later discussions, 
we will propose our view that these laid off workers constitute an effective segment of the 
labor supply pool of the unskilled workers, which presents the one possibility for the limiting 
o f   f u r t h e r   i n c r e a s e s   i n   t h e   w a g e s   o f   u n s k i l l e d   l a b o r .              
                                                 
7  The monetarization of non-wage benefits is likely another force that contributed to rising wages in the state 
sector. Under planning, SOEs provided various non-wage benefits such as housing services, health care, work 
insurance and even child care for the children of their employees. With state sector restructuring, such benefits 
have been monetized, converting the implicit or shadow wages to explicit wages. Such processes have coincided 
with massive layoffs in SOEs, contributing to wage growth in China’s public sector (see Ge and Yang, 2009).                 11
 
C. Wages by Region   
Three decades into the era of reform, the once-egalitarian distribution of wages across 
China’s provinces has disappeared, replaced by significant variations in worker compensation 
that define the regional comparative advantage in labor costs within China itself. Recent 
literature has shown that regional equality declined in the initial phase of reform between 
1978 and 1985, but inter-regional inequality has increased considerably since then (e.g., 
Yang, 2002; Kanbur and Zhang, 2005; Wan et al., 2007). While earlier studies have used per 
capita income or consumption expenditures as measures of inequality, with time coverage 
usually ending with China’s entrance into the WTO in 2001, we present evidence of wage 
distributions across China’s regions and provinces and update the coverage to 2007. Our 
measure of wage dispersions for workers, rather than consumption or per capita income, offer 
more direct information on inequality that also is relevant for the study of varying regional 
labor costs. 
Figure 2 presents the real annual wage of staff and workers across six regions in China,
8 
showing diverging wage patterns. During the first decade of reform, the average wages of all 
regions were clustered; but by now, the Southeastern and Bohai regions have the highest 
average wages in the nation, surpassing the wage levels of four other regions by about 
                                                 
8  Following NBS’s system of regional classifications, we group China’s 30 provinces into six regions: Bohai 
(consisting of Beijing plus surrounding provinces), Southeast (including Shanghai, Guangdong and other coastal 
provinces), Northeast (representing several traditional industrial regions of China), Central, Southwest, and 
Northwest. Tibet is not grouped into any of the regions because it has a very short series of wage data and the 
sample size is very small. Regional wages are computed as weighted averages of provincial wages, where the 
weights are employment shares of staff and workers of the provinces within the regions. Our data appendix 
contains detailed descriptions of data and the complete tabulations of provincial and regional wages for the 
period 1978-2007 are available upon reader’s request.   12
30-40%. The highest wage growth in the past twenty years has occurred in the in 
Southeastern and Bohai regions, coastal areas where the mega-cities of Beijing, Shanghai, 
Guangzhou and Shenzhen are located. The lopsided high wages in coastal regions and 
metropolises—along with fast wage growth across all regions since the late 1990s—lend data 
support to anecdotal evidence of rising wages and labor shortages described in recent media 
and government reports. Using two standard inequality measures, the GINI coefficient and 
coefficient of variation, Table 1 provides additional evidence on the extent of diverging labor 
earnings across provinces and regions in China. Overall, regional wage variations have 
increased persistently and significantly in the past three decades. Comparing average values 
of the two inequality indicators for the periods 1978-1985 and 2001-2007, wage inequality 
nearly doubled across provinces and almost tripled across regions.
9  Today, large regional 
variations in labor earnings exist in China.   
A series of government policies and strategies, including urban-specific fiscal and credit 
programs as well as development strategies tilted towards the growth of coastal regions, 
especially when combined with restrictions on factor mobility, has contributed to unbalanced 
regional growth (e.g., Yang, 2002). Moreover, as Demurger et al. (2002) argues, initial 
economic conditions, such as advantageous geographic factors and superior endowments in 
physical and human capital, also helped attract FDI and promoted trade in the coastal regions. 
By the end of 1990s, the Chinese government became keenly aware that imbalanced 
                                                 
9  The GINI coefficients reported in Table 1 are notably low relative to GINI coefficients of income estimated 
using individual or household data, which have grown over the past three decades. One reason is that wages as 
measured here tend to have less variation than income due to the exclusion of non-labor earnings. Another 
reason is that aggregate wage inequality measures across provinces and regions do not necessarily reflect wage 
inequality across individuals within the aggregate units.                 13
development could result in instability and other social problems. This led to the launch of 
the Western Development Strategy, which aimed to reduce the severe inequality between 
coastal and interior regions. Consistent with this policy objective, the four measures of 
inequality we track indeed stopped increasing in recent years; and in 2006 and 2007, most 
measures of inequality actually declined. This could be the beginning of more balanced 
r e g i o n a l   d e v e l o p m e n t   i n   C h i n a .                       
 
D. Wages by Industry 
Similar to wage patterns across regions, there is a clear diverging trend in wage levels across 
industries. As Figure 3 shows, wages across industries stay clustered until the early 1990s, 
but then average wages for skill-intensive industries, such as banking and insurance and 
scientific research and polytechnic services, rocketed past the wage levels in labor-intensive 
industries of manufacturing, construction, whole sale and retail services.
10  For instance, in 
1990, the average wage in construction (5,729 Yuan) was only about 14% higher than the 
average in banking and insurance (5,040 Yuan). However, by 2007, the latter (49,435 Yuan) 
was 2.6 times of the former (18,758 Yuan). Specifically for 2007, the industries that had the 
highest wages were Banking and Insurance (49,435 Yuan), Information & Computer (49,225 
Yuan) and Scientific Research (38,879 Yuan). These wage trends reflect the rise in rewards 
to skills (or education) during China’s economic transition. Indeed, the rate of return to 
education in urban China has increased from only 3-4% per year of schooling in the late 
1980s to above 10% in recent years (e.g.,  Yang,  2005;  Zhang  et  al.,  2005).       
                                                 
10  While Figure 3 presents wage trends for manufacturing, construction and selected service industries, the Data 
Appendix reports additional wage information covering all 19 industries based on the industrial classification 
system  of  the  NBS.      14
We emphasize one important finding. Contrary to popular belief that manufacturing 
wages grew the fastest because of China’s rapidly increasing volume of exports, wage growth 
in this sector has been below the national average. This is despite the fact that manufactured 
goods accounted for more than 90% of China’s exports and attracted approximately 60% of 
FDI in recent years (NBSa, 2007, 2008). In fact, manufacturing wages have moved in 
lockstep with wages in construction and wholesale and retail services, which are largely 
non-tradable sectors of the economy. There is strong evidence that competitive labor markets 
for unskilled workers have developed across these basic production and service industries, so 
that the wages in these industries have moved jointly. The upward movements in wages have 
been limited because workers in these industries can be drawn from the large pool of rural, 
“floating” laborers in cities, a group which has encompassed 130-200 million people in recent 
years. Rises in the wages of skilled labor, especially those with high educational attainment 
working in advanced service industries, have been the major force behind China’s dramatic 
increases in the general wage level. The following section will compare manufacturing wages 
in China with those in its neighboring economies in order to shed light on China’s 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l   l a b o r   c o s t   c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s .                               
  
III. International Wage Comparisons 
Despite its considerable importance, data related to comparable cross country wages are not 
easily available or usable, largely due to the obstacle of international wage data being subject 
to a patchwork of definitions and coverage, all typically unique to individual country 
standards. The ILO October Inquiry labor market statistics for manufacturing are the most 
widely used data source in international wage studies (ILO, 2009). Based on this source,   15
Freeman and Oostendorp (2000) transform wage information into a consistent data file for 
161 occupations in over 150 countries from 1983 to 1998 and examine the pattern of pay 
across occupations and countries. While researchers have studied the effect of globalization 
and openness on wages (e.g., Freeman et al., 2001; Majid, 2004), their coverage is typically 
only up to late 1990s and their focus is not on China’s comparative labor costs relative to 
other economies. Most closely related to our work is Adams et al. (2006), who compare 
China’s manufacturing wages as an important factor of global competitiveness with several 
neighboring economies, covering the period 1992 to 2001. Their findings corroborate the 
evidence reported by Lett and Banister (2006) that, in 2004, China’s average hourly 
manufacturing compensation of $0.67 was only 2.9% that of the U.S. and far below that of 
other Asian newly industrialized economies.
11 
  Instead of conducting wage comparisons for sporadic years, we take a comprehensive 
approach to the question by compiling and transforming original ILO data into comparable 
manufacturing wage series covering the period 1979 to 2007 for China and its Asian 
neighbors. In addition, we include a second data source, the UNIDO dataset, for making 
comparisons of manufacturing labor earnings (UNIDO, 2007). The UNIDO data has never 
been used to study China’s labor cost conditions, because China was not included in the 
sample. Recently, however, Wu and Yue (2008) have applied standard definitions of labor 
earnings comparable to those used by ILO and UNIDO and estimated manufacturing wages 
for China. We incorporate their newly available findings into the standard UNIDO data set 
                                                 
11 Chen  et al. (forthcoming) and Ceglowski and Golub (2007) represent another string of studies that use the 
measure of unit labor costs (ULC) for assessing China’s  global  labor  competitiveness.        16
covering the period 1981 to 2004,
12  thus enabling us to check the robustness of the 
comparative wage studies based on two alternative data series. In total, our study comprises 
six developing economies—China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, 
as well as five developed economies—Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. 
Comparable time series of manufacturing wages are constructed through two steps: first, 
we use country specific CPI with 2007 as the base year to obtain the real wage in local 
currency over time; then, we use 2007 exchange rates to the U.S. dollar to standardize 
different currencies. This approach has the advantage of capturing price trends within 
individual countries, thus enabling over-time wage comparisons across countries in a single 
currency. Monthly earnings per worker are used as the measure of wages, and similar to 
Chinese statistics, we use earnings and wages interchangeably. As defined in ILO 
LABORSTA Internet Yearly Statistics, earnings “relate to remuneration in cash and in kind 
paid to employees, as a rule at regular intervals, for time worked or work done together with 
remuneration for time not worked, such as for annual vacation, other paid leave or holidays.” 
Thus, earnings exclude employers’ contributions to social security, pension schemes, and also 
exclude severance and termination pay. The UNIDO definition of earnings is similar to that 
of the ILO; see the Data Appendix for details of constructing and adjusting for comparable 
cross-country wages.   
Beginning with the ILO comparisons, Figure 4A shows that the manufacturing wage 
in China was well below other selected developing economies in Asia in the 1980s, but 
because of the strong growth since the late 1990s, the gaps are largely closed. By 2007, 
                                                 
12  The 2005 UNIDO statistics are the latest available data because of its three-year lag data availability policy.     17
China’s manufacturing wages was comparable to the levels of the Philippines and Thailand, 
although still significantly below that of Malaysia. Figure 4B indicates that even though the 
manufacturing wage in China has increased at a fast clip over the past three decades, there 
remains an enormous gap between manufacturing wages in China and those in developed 
economies. In 2007, China’s manufacturing wage was about 7% of Japan, 8-9% of Korea and 
Singapore, and 18-21% of Taiwan and Hong Kong (see Table 2). These results are clear 
evidence of the fact that China’s wages have remained comparatively low and have not 
priced China out of its global advantages as the world’s workshop and FDI magnet. 
  Our investigations based on the UNIDO statistical source carried out independently 
from the ILO data series lead to the same conclusion. Although wage levels implied by 
UNIDO data do not necessarily match with the ILO series, due in part to the differences in 
data collection methods, Figure 4 reveals that the overall picture remains the same. While fast 
earnings growth has already propelled manufacturing wages in China above those of 
Indonesia and India in the late 1990s, it still trails behind that of Malaysia and Thailand, and 
stays significantly below the levels in Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Japan. Indeed, the 
large percentage wage rises in China over the past one and half decades are essentially 
matched in absolute terms by wage rises in developed Asian economies or regions (see Table 
2).  
  The wage comparisons presented so far have not taken into account the influence of 
recent currency appreciation of the Chinese Yuan on labor market competitiveness and the 
potential consequences of China’s explosive growth in foreign exchange reserves.
13 Between 
                                                 
13  We thank the referee for directing our attention to the effect of exchange rate fluctuations on labor market   18
June 2005 (when the strict dollar peg was abandoned) and July 2008, the Chinese Yuan 
appreciated by nearly 15% against the US dollar, and since then the exchange rate has 
fluctuated around a narrow range of 6.83 to 6.85 Yuan to 1 US dollar; ceteris paribus, 
China’s labor costs in US dollar-denominated accounts rose accordingly. Parallel to currency 
appreciation, China’s foreign exchange reserves began to grow at a significant pace starting 
from 2000 and the accumulation accelerated in more recent years. By March 2009, China’s 
foreign reserves topped 1.95 trillion US dollars, the largest among all countries in the world. 
It is widely believed that the Chinese Yuan will appreciate further if the central bank of China 
relaxes its control over the determination of exchange rates. 
To incorporate the effect of exchange rate fluctuations, we also adopt a second approach 
in making international wage comparisons. First, we use year-by-year exchange rates of local 
currencies to convert manufacturing wages of individual countries into US dollars (indexed 
annually). Then, we deflate the wage series by consumer price index (CPI) of the US, using 
2007 as the reference year, putting the data in comparable terms. Therefore, this alternative 
wage measure takes into account the changes in exchange rate of individual countries as well 
as the price trends of the US economy. This approach reflects the perspective of a US 
multinational business, or other companies using dollar-denominated accounts, who care 
about year-by-year wage calculations of labor costs in China and other economies. The 
results of the calculations based on both ILO and UNIDO data, which are broadly consistent 
with those found for the same countries covered in Figures 4 and 5, are reported in Figures 
A1 and A2 of the Data Appendix. The figures show that the long-term wage trends across 
                                                                                                                                                        
competitiveness and for valuable suggestions of carrying out related analysis.           19
countries are very similar to the patterns revealed in Figures 4 and 5, and all major 
conclusions continue to hold, although there are notably year-over-year variations in 
manufacturing wages due to exchange rate shifts, including the effects of severe currency 
depreciation in several economies during the Asian Financial Crisis in the late 1990s. While 
it is difficult to forecast whether China will reduce its control over the exchange rate of Yuan 
given added pressure for policy shifts stemming from growth in foreign reserves, existing 
evidence suggests that potential currency appreciation in the next several years is unlikely to 
alter  the  major  conclusions  we  have  drawn  on  China’s  labor  market  competitiveness.                    
Therefore, two different data sources with two alternative data measures both underline 
the fact that the rising wage trend in China, while significant, belies no implication that its 
advantage as a major supplier of low cost labor will be displaced soon. The next section 
assesses the reasons driving the different spreads between skilled and unskilled labor, and 
outlines a framework for assessing the likely development of wage trends in China, 
determined by fundamental demand and supply forces in the labor market. 
 
IV. Will China Maintain its Labor Cost Advantage? 
The wages trends analyzed above have captured the major features of China’s evolving wage 
structures up to 2008, before the world economy plunged into the still deepening financial 
and economic crisis. Essentially, both cross-country manufacturing wage comparisons and 
the analysis of domestic labor earnings convey the same message: although there have been 
wage increases across the board, there is a clear difference between increases in the skilled 
and those in unskilled sectors. While wages for skilled labor increased sharply, wages for 
unskilled labor in manufacturing, construction and basic service sectors are still low,   20
compared with both skill intensive sectors in China and wages in other developed Asian 
economies. This finding partly addresses some of the concern over China potentially losing 
its competitive edge due to its fast wage growth in recent years. Indeed, it is the sharp 
increase in the wages of skilled labor and the increasing share of the skilled labor in the total 
labor force that is the main thrust behind the overall wage rise pattern in China. Below we 
present some analyses of this wage growth disparity in skilled and unskilled labor, and argue 
that due to major shifts in demand and supply conditions in the labor market, the pace of 
rising wages for both skilled and unskilled labor is likely to slow down in the foreseeable 
future.  
Strong demand for labor stemmed from the unprecedented GDP growth of more 10% 
per annum, and export growth of nearly 30% per annum since China’s WTO accession in 
2001 has been the major force pushing up the wage of workers with low skills. However, 
with exports and GDP growth likely cooling down to more sustainable levels, the demand for 
labor will lessen accordingly. Moreover, despite China’s remarkable export growth in 
manufactured goods, total employment in manufacturing has only increased modestly at an 
annual rate of about 3% in recent years (NBSa, 2008). Since the manufacturing sector 
employs predominantly workers with low education, its moderate pace of growing demand, 
perhaps neutralized by improved productivity coming from continued enterprise privatization 
and intense global competition, is not putting on additional pressure on labor demand. 
  With anticipated moderate demand for unskilled labor, the supply situation does not 
appear as depressing at all as what anecdotal evidence seems to suggest. Even though only 
one-fourth of the villages surveyed by the Development Research Council reported having   21
young workers who can be transferred out of agriculture, this remaining population is still, in 
absolute terms, a huge untapped labor pool. According to Cai (2007), there are 490 million 
rural laborers in China, of which close to 200 million are employed in non-agricultural work. 
With current agricultural production technology, 180 million rural laborers are needed to 
maintain current level of agriculture output. Hence, there are about 110 million idle rural 
laborers with about 58 million under the age of 40. This represents a viable segment of the 
population left to shift into non-agricultural work, one sign that there is no imminent threat of 
a supply crunch in unskilled labor. 
  Furthermore, during the economic restructuring period from 1996 to 2002, there were 
about 40 million workers who lost their jobs, as detailed above. Most of these unemployed 
workers are middle aged, but remain potentially productive. According to statistics published 
by Beijing Statistical Bureau, 38% of the city’s 3.84 million unemployed in 2000 were 
between the ages of 35 to 44, making it the single largest age group among Beijing’s 
unemployed. That percentage increased to 40 in 2002 according to China News (July 24, 
2003). Thus, with unemployment rates hovering at double digits in many Chinese cities after 
the era of state-sector restructuring (Giles et al., 2005; Knight and Xue, 2006), mid-aged 
unemployed workers form another potential supply of unskilled labor, over and above the 
estimated 58 million young idle rural laborers. It is well known in China that an 
overwhelming majority of the employers impose an age requirement of 35 and below for job 
hiring. As wage rises further, these age prejudices are likely to be relaxed, and there will be 
more active participation responses from those laid-off workers. Thus, the supply of unskilled   22
labor will not be in danger of any severe shortages, implying a strong likelihood for wages in 
the corresponding sectors to remain competitive. 
  While wage growth in labor intensive industries is likely moderated by smooth demand 
and an ample supply of unskilled labor, will the wage of skilled workers continue the steep 
climb? We believe that the sharp increases in the returns to skill will likely taper off in the 
near future because of two reasons. First, the rate of return to education, which has been 
tripled in the past two decades, has already reached the conventional levels observed in other 
market economies. As a legacy from central planning, low returns to schooling persisted for 
more than a decade since the inception of reform in late 1970s. However, beginning in the 
early 1990s, a set of major factors—including capital accumulation, labor market competition, 
inflow of FDI, export growth, state-sector restructuring, and skill-biased technological 
change—have increased general demand for skills (e.g., Zhao 2001; Ge and Yang, 2009). As 
a result, the estimated returns to education increased persistently, already exceeding 10% by 
the early 2000s (e.g., Zhang et al., 2005). In comparison, the average rate of return to another 
year of schooling is 9.7% for the world and 9.9 % for Asia.
14  As Chinese labor institutions 
approach completion of their transition to competitive markets, there will be limited scope for 
further increases in the returns to education. 
        Another major factor that prevents explosive growth in the wages of skilled labor is the 
large supply of college graduates over the past several years and those matriculating in the 
foreseeable future. Due to ever increasing demand for well educated workers and 
                                                 
14  George Psacharopoulos has published extensive summaries on rate of return to schooling estimates covering 
a wide variety of countries over time. The cited numbers are from his most recent global update, Psacharopoulos 
and Patrinos (2004); his earlier summaries were published in 1973, 1985 and 1994.             23
professionals, the Chinese government decided to expand university enrollment in the late 
1990s, resulting in a steep increase in the numbers of college graduates from 2001 and on. In 
1998, the total number of admitted college students was approximately 1.08 million, a 
number that rose to 2.68 million in span of just three years. The year 2003 saw 1.88 million 
students graduating from universities, an increase of 40.4% from 2002, and 2.3 times the total 
number of graduates in 1998 (NBSa, 2004). According to the Ministry of Human Resources 
and Social Security (MHRSS), the number of new graduates reached a new record of 4.95 
million in 2007—a 20% increase from 2006 (MHRSS, 2008); and in 2008, total graduates 
increased again to 5.59 million. Despite well recognized problems such as aggressive 
increases in college enrollment potentially leading to significant declines in the quality of 
university education, especially among the newly expanded schools, and a college curriculum 
has long been criticized for its emphasis on memorization instead of practical skills, the sheer 
number of workers with college training will probably outweigh any other factors in applying 
downward pressure on college wage premiums.   
Supplementary to domestic college graduates, another source of talent supply is returned 
overseas Chinese who often hold advanced degrees, have high level of English competence, 
and possess sought-after international work experience. Despite high demand for these talents, 
the number of returnees is still not overwhelming, with estimates varying from 140,000 to 
275,000 (China Education Press, May 17, 2007). Recognizing the potential contributions that 
could be made by returnees, China’s Ministry of Education has taken a number of actions to 
encourage overseas Chinese, especially scientists, engineers and executives, to return. 
Measures include a waiver of household registration, exemption from payroll quotas, flexible   24
pay packages, and preferential access to jobs and schools for their family members. The 
government has also granted priority to the children and spouses of returnees in university 
admission and employment. The total number of overseas returnees has been on the rise in 
the past two to three years, a trend that should continue as economic conditions in North 
America and Europe continue to deteriorate. The inflow of professionals to China will help 
mitigate any upward pressure on wages, containing it within reasonable bounds.             
 
V. Concluding Remarks   
In this paper we have addressed the public concern over China’s rapidly rising wages in recent 
years that are alleged to undermine China’s global competitive labor advantage. Based on 
detailed data adjustments and careful construction, we have analyzed major changes in China’s 
wage structures by ownership, region and industry for the period 1978-2007 and compared 
China’s manufacturing wage level with neighboring Asian economies. Despite the dramatic 
overall wage growth in China, we find a persistently increasing gap between the wages in 
skill-intensive industries and labor-intensive industries, but we anticipate a robust supply of 
labor and skill will likely stabilize China’s wage growth to a moderate pace in the near future. 
Compared with its neighboring economies, manufacturing wage in China remains only a small 
fraction of those in other developed Asian economies and has just started to approach other 
emerging markets. Therefore, China is likely to maintain a global labor advantage to support its 
status as the world’s factory and remain an attractive destination for FDI.  
This assessment of evolving wage structures can be viewed as directly applicable to 
China’s labor market conditions up to the third quarter of 2008. The outbreak and subsequent 
deterioration in the financial and economic situation have caused fundamental changes to   25
domestic labor markets and the international competitive landscape. Unemployment 
skyrocketed in all major economies, and there was enormous downward pressure on wages 
along with the collapse of energy prices. Concerns over rising wages in China and other 
emerging markets subsumed. The focus was entirely on the scenarios of anticipated horrific 
job losses. 
It has become clear that the employment of unskilled labor in China, especially those 
rural migrants working temporarily in cities, took the heaviest blow. Signs of mass layoffs 
occurred in the second half of 2008. By October, according to estimates made by the Ministry 
of Human Resources and Social Security, 5.4% of the 130 million rural migrants had already 
returned their homes in countryside because they lost their city jobs. Based on surveys 
conducted by the Ministry of Agriculture in 120 villages, 6.5% rural migrants had returned 
home by the end of October 2008. According to NBS estimates, this rate rose to 10% by the 
end of 2008. One month later, 15.3% of migrant workers, or 20 million, had lost their jobs, 
according to Chen Xiwen, director of the Office of the Central Leading Group on Rural 
Work. Using 782.4 million people as the economically active population in China in 2007 
(NBSa, 2008), these newly lost jobs among migrants alone would push up the nationwide 
unemployment rate by 2.6%. Lost jobs were heavily concentrated in export-oriented 
manufacturing  and  construction  related  businesses  (Bottelier,  2009).                
It appears that layoffs among high skilled urban workers have been rather limited. This 
is likely the outcome of the government’s feverish attempts to control unemployment during 
this economic downtime, in fear that mass unemployment would lead to social instability. In 
the Document No. 4 issued by the State Council on February 3, 2009, China’s central   26
government placed job creation at the center of the current macroeconomic and structural 
adjustment policies. Detailed directives aiming at job creation included support for 
labor-intensive projects, favorable financing policies for small and medium size enterprises 
who could effectively absorb employment, provision of special incentives for hiring college 
graduates, and massive policy programs in forms of tax rebates, tax rate reductions, special 
loans, and reductions in social security submissions to secure the continued viability of 
enterprises and thus maintain a healthy demand for jobs. Moreover, a new regulation requires 
enterprises who plan to lay off 20 or more people or more than 10% of their labor force must 
inform the upper level labor unions 30 days prior to the action. In effect, this sets in an 
approval mechanism for all significant layoffs. Local governments have been mobilized to 
achieve re-employment targets and conduct training programs at deep discount rates for rural 
migrants and urban unemployed. All of these policies were carried out immediately. 
  The implementation of these policies has effectively eliminated any large scale layoffs 
in urban China. Understandably, the protection of employment positions has been at the 
expense of lowered salaries for existing employees, consistent with a survey report that 26% 
of workers in Beijing already experienced wage cuts due to the ongoing financial crisis (The 
Beijing News, January 6, 2009). Relative to flat-out unemployment, employment with 
reduced earnings is much less likely to cause social friction. The layoffs of rural migrants are 
not likely to cause severe social conflicts either, because those who lost their jobs have a 
safety net: namely returning to their rural homes. Rural land in China is not yet fully 
privatized. Returning home to participate in farm production or to find a local non-farm job 
may serve as a buffer to diffuse the fallout from urban unemployment. The much improved   27
rural environment, supported in part by the elimination of agricultural taxation in 2006 and 
dramatic increases in rural investments in 2008, have led to major improvements in the 
quality  of  living  in  rural  China.             
  Interventionist policies, however, will unavoidably create inefficiencies in the economic 
system. A remarkable achievement of China through the past decade is that globalization, 
market competition and state-sector restructuring have dramatically enhanced the labor 
productivity of all domestic enterprises in both state and non-state sector. Unfortunately, the 
ongoing interventions of the government to protect employment are reversing the 
achievements of increasing labor productivity and optimizing labor allocation. When output 
declines with the unfolding of the economic crisis, the existence of disguised unemployment 
in both the rural and urban sectors will no doubt lower China’s overall labor productivity and 
international competitiveness. Restoring the efficiency of labor allocation will be a 
challenging task facing China both for now and in years after the ongoing economic crisis, 
and that process will play an important role in determining China’s future global labor 
a d v a n t a g e .               
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Figure 4. Comparison of Monthly Manufacturing Wages between China and 
Other Asian Economies, 1979-2007 (2007 US Dollars) 
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Figure 5. Comparison of Monthly Manufacturing Wages between China and Other 
Asian Economies, 1981-2004 (2007 US Dollars) 
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Table 1. Wage Inequality across Provinces, Regions and Industries 
 
GINI CV GINI CV GINI CV
1978 8.6 16.3 4.8 7.9 10.3 18.1
1979 8.5 15.9 3.4 5.8 10.4 18.3
1980 7.5 14.6 4.7 7.9 9.7 17.2
1981 7.5 14.5 2.9 5.0 9.5 16.9
1982 7.7 14.9 3.4 5.6 9.3 16.7
1983 8.6 17.3 4.0 6.4 10.1 17.6
1984 9.1 18.1 5.2 8.4 10.0 17.8
1985 9.1 18.1 5.4 8.7 8.8 15.2
1986 8.8 17.2 5.3 8.7 8.1 14.0
1987 9.1 17.8 5.4 8.7 8.1 13.9
1988 9.5 18.1 5.9 9.6 5.9 11.0
1989 10.1 19.1 6.3 10.3 7.1 12.6
1990 9.3 17.6 6.5 10.6 7.7 13.6
1991 9.2 17.2 6.8 11.3 8.1 14.1
1992 9.7 19.1 8.1 13.9 7.8 14.3
1993 10.9 21.6 9.3 16.3 9.2 16.9
1994 12.7 24.1 11.1 18.9 11.7 20.4
1995 12.3 24.5 11.0 19.5 11.2 19.6
1996 12.8 25.8 11.2 19.8 11.7 20.3
1997 13.6 27.3 12.1 21.3 12.9 22.2
1998 13.9 28.0 10.8 19.9 12.5 21.7
1999 13.8 28.7 11.5 21.1 13.3 22.9
2000 14.2 28.5 11.8 21.1 13.9 23.8
2001 14.7 29.1 12.0 21.7 14.9 25.4
2002 14.1 27.9 12.1 21.5 15.4 26.3
2003 14.3 29.1 12.3 22.2 18.3 34.6
2004 14.0 29.1 12.2 21.6 18.5 34.1
2005 13.8 29.4 11.2 20.2 19.1 35.3
2006 14.0 30.2 9.5 17.1 19.6 35.8
2007 13.4 30.0 8.8 15.9 19.9 36.1
78-85 Avg.  8.3 16.2 4.2 7.0 9.8 17.2
86-90 Avg.  9.4 17.9 5.9 9.6 7.4 13.0
91-95 Avg.  10.9 21.3 9.3 16.0 9.6 17.1
96-00 Avg.  13.6 27.6 11.5 20.7 12.9 22.2
01-07 Avg.  14.0 29.3 11.1 20.1 17.9 32.5





Table 2: Comparison of Monthly Manufacturing Wages between China and Other Asian Economies (2007 USD) 
Year China Malaysia Philippines Thailand Hong Kong Japan Korea Singapore Taiwan
1980 42.6 238.3 133.2 2779.3 601.5
1985 49.4 343.3 213.0 230.6 718.9 2976.9 784.5
1990 55.4 322.5 307.6 206.6 900.5 3270.7 1320.7 1216.8 929.6
1995 71.7 403.3 304.3 248.4 877.0 3352.4 1859.3 1657.1 1141.0
2000 111.3 478.8 296.4 255.1 1024.4 3471.5 2180.4 2227.2 1267.5
2005 187.4 324.1 255.0 932.5 3537.5 2840.9 2484.4 1318.1
2007 233.5 260.3 1089.2 3583.4 3055.9 2595.1 1327.6
2007: China/country 1.00 0.90 0.21 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.18
Year China India Indonesia Malaysia Thailand Hong Kong Japan Korea Singapore
1981 41.4 119.3 68.3 259.2 825.2 578.8 875.7
1985 53.6 146.6 87.3 343.5 280.1 955.7 2695.5 733.1 1233.2
1990 67.3 161.6 73.8 327.1 291.4 1267.7 2955.8 1233.0 1421.4
1995 100.7 175.5 126.4 403.5 328.6 1429.4 3047.9 1819.7 1846.3
2000 237.0 175.2 133.9 481.1 325.0 1524.4 3136.2 2030.9 2208.6
2004 247.6 180.5 615.6 3191.3 2240.2
2004: China/country 1.00 1.37 0.40 0.08 0.11
A. ILO Wage Data
Emerging markets Developed economies
B. UNIDO Earnings Data  
Emerging markets Developed economies
 
Data Source: ILO (2009), UNIDO (2007), Wu and Yue (2008) and authors' calculation.   37
Data Appendix: Description of Data Sources and Adjustments 
 
I. Data for China 
The nominal Chinese wage data and CPI figures used in this paper are from three sources: 
China Statistical Yearbooks (NBSa, various yeras), Comprehensive Statistical Data and 
Materials on 55 Years of New China (NBSb, 2004) and the database of CEIC Data Company. 
We use urban CPI and choose 2007 -- the latest year with available data -- as the base year, 
converting nominal wages into real terms for time series analysis. Provincial wages are 
deflated by provincial urban CPIs (except for Shanghai and Chongqing, where total 
provincial CPIs are used in their place), while wages by industry and wages by different 
ownership types are adjusted by national urban CPI, as industry and ownership type specific 
CPI data is not available.     
Urban CPI instead of provincial CPI is used for two reasons: Firstly, it is more complete. 
Most provinces have urban CPI data from 1979 but more limited availability of provincial 
CPI, except for the prefecture-level municipalities of Chongqing and Shanghai, where we use 
provincial CPI instead, due to its greater historical availability. Secondly, urban CPI is more 
consistent with the definition of staff and workers, which does not include people employed 
in township enterprises. Urban CPI is missing for Chongqing from 1978 to 1983 and for 
Tibet from 1978 to 1988.   
      29 provinces are grouped into 7 regions following the international convention as the 
following. Bohai (Beijing, Tianjin, Shandong, Hebei), Southeast (Shanghai, Zhejiang, 
Guangdong, Jiangsu, Fujian), Northeast (Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Jilin), Central (Hunan, 
Anhui, Hubei, Henan, Jiangxi) Southwest (Chongqing, Yunnan, Sichuan, Guangxi, Hainan,   38
Guizhou), and Northwest (Qinghai, Ningxia, Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, Xinjiang, Gansu, 
Shaanxi). Tibet is not grouped into any of the regions because it has a very short series of 
wage data and the sample size is very small. Regional wages are calculated as the weighted 
average of the provincial wages within that region, with the shares of staff and workers being 
used as weights. Provincial staff and workers’ wages are missing for Inner Mongolia (1979) 
and Chongqing (1979, 1981-84). Missing staff and workers numbers include: Inner Mongolia 
(1979), Hainan (1979), Chongqing (1979, 1981-84). 
      From 2003, the National Bureau of Statistics changed the coverage and definition of five 
industry sectors, and extended the original classification of 15 industry sectors to include 19. 
Matching is performed for the following five industry sectors between the old category and 
new category for the purpose of a complete time series data (new category in parenthesis): 
geological prospect and water conservancy (water conservancy, environment and public 
utility management), social services (residential service and other service), education, culture 
art, radio, film and TV (education), scientific research and polytechnic service (scientific 
research, technical service and geological), government party agencies and social 
organization (public management and social organization). The following four sectors were 
added in 2003, so our database contains only five years of data for these four sectors: 
information transmission, computer service and software, accommodation and catering trade, 
leasing and commercial service, and culture, sport and recreation. 
 
II. International Manufacturing Wages   39
International manufacturing wages are from two sources: International Labor Organization 
(ILO) LABORSTA database at http://laborsta.ilo.org/ (ILO, 2009) and United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO, 2007).   
For ILO data, earnings per month data are reported for most of our chosen economies 
except for Hong Kong and Thailand, where wage rate per day and wage rate per month are 
reported, respectively. Definitions of earnings and wage rate are different in the ILO 
documentation:  
“The concept of earnings, as applied in wages statistics, relates to remuneration in cash 
and in kind paid to employees, as a rule at regular intervals, for time worked or work done 
together with remuneration for time not worked, such as for annual vacation, other paid leave 
or holidays. Earnings exclude employers’ contributions in respect of their employees paid to 
social security and pension schemes and also the benefits received by employees under these 
schemes. Earnings also exclude severance and termination pay.”   
“Wage rates should include basic wages, cost-of-living allowances and other guaranteed 
and regularly paid allowances, but exclude overtime payments, bonuses and gratuities, family 
allowances and other social security payments made by employers. Ex gratia payments in 
kind, supplementary to normal wage rates, are also excluded.”   
Comparison between the above two definitions shows overtime payments are not 
included in the wage rate. Thus reported working hours for Hong Kong and Thailand are used 
to convert wage into earnings which take into account the overtime payment. Specifically, the 
calculation is as follows:   
  Working hours per week is used to convert wage per day into earnings per month for   40
Hong Kong: earnings per month = (wage per day / 8 ) × working hours per week × 4.3, 
where we assume that the daily working hours is 8, and 4.3 weeks per month is 
calculated by dividing 52 weeks a year by 12 months. 
  Working hours per month is used to convert wage per month into earnings per month 
for Thailand: Earnings per month = [(wage per month) / (40 × 4.3)] × working hours 
per month, where we assume that the weekly working hours are 40 (8 hours per day and 
five days per week). Data on working hours are not complete for Thailand. For 
1983-1995, hours of work per month are reported, and for 2000-2003 hours of work per 
week are reported, which are multiplied by 4.3 to get the monthly working hours. 
Missing values for hours of work are estimated as the following: for years after 2003, 
2003 number is used; for years 1980-82, 1983 number is used; for years 1996-1999, the 
average of year 1995 and 2000 working hours is used. The reason we did not use a 
linear interpolation to estimate the missing working hours as we did in missing earnings 
data is that there is not a clearly increasing or decreasing trend of the working hours 
over the years. 
 
Different from ILO data, where earnings per month in total manufacturing for each 
economy is directly reported, UNIDO reports total annual wage bills and numbers for 
employment for all sub-sectors in manufacturing for each country. Thus monthly 
manufacturing wages are derived by dividing the annual wages in all manufacturing sectors 
by the total number of employees in the manufacturing, and then the annual individual wages 
are divided by 12 to get the monthly wages. Definition of wage in UNIDO reads: “The   41
estimates of wages and salaries include all payments in cash or in kind made to “employees” 
or “operatives,” as the case may be, during the reference year in relation to work done for the 
establishment. The payments include: (a) direct wages and salaries; (b) remuneration for time 
not worked; (c) bonuses and gratuities; (d) housing allowances and family allowances paid 
directly by the employer; and (e) payments in kind. Excluded are the employers' 
contributions in respect of their employees paid to social security, pension and insurance 
schemes, as well as the benefits received by employees under these schemes and severance 
and termination pay.” This definition is comparable to the earnings in ILO. 
      Although China is not included in the original UNIDO dataset, we bring in a comparable 
series for China based on the work of Wu and Yue (2008) who have applied standard 
definitions of labor earnings comparable to those used by ILO and UNIDO. They have 
explained the details of their estimation methods.   
      Data on Japan require special adjustment. There are two different periods based on 
different coverage, though the industrial classifications of both periods are under 
ISIC-Revision 2. From 1979 to 1993, the data include family allowances and mid- and year 
end bonuses.  However, this sample design was revised beginning in 1994. From 1994-2003, 
the data only covers private sector and establishments with 10 or more regular employees.  It 
is from June of each year, and measures regular scheduled cash earnings. Thus there is a 
downward kink between the year of 1993 and 1994 due to the exclusion of the allowances and 
bonuses. In ILO data, two earnings are reported for the year of 1993 under two different 
coverage systems, giving us the ratio of bonuses among total wage. Assuming that the bonus 
ratio among total earnings stayed constant over the years, we adjusted wages after 1993 by   42
multiplying the reported wage with 1 plus the value of the bonus ratio. However, UNIDO data 
has no such availability of two earnings for the same year under two different coverage 
systems. To try to standardize data after 1993 with the new definition, we constructed 
estimates of the average bonus percentage of total wage in the following way. We took the 
average annual growth rate from 1994 to 1996 and interpolated back to the start of data 
collection in 1985. Then, comparing these estimates of bonus-free wages with the given data, 
we constructed an average bonus percentage for those years. We finally use this percentage to 
standardize the bonus-exclusive data. 
There are several missing wages in both ILO and UNIDO data; if the missing value is in 
the middle of two years with available data, a linear interpolation is used to estimate the 
wage, in order to keep the continuation of the data without affecting the overall trend. 
However, if the earnings are missing in the beginning or the ending years, no estimation is 
made. The country-year missing earnings estimated for ILO include: Philippines 2000 and 
2002, Taiwan 2003, Thailand 1987 and 1988, Malaysia 1998 and 1999; and for UNIDO: 
Malaysia 1998, Thailand 1983, 1985, 1987, 1992, 1995, 1997 and 1999. 
Both earnings and wages in ILO and UNIDO are in nominal local currency. After 
consolidating the earnings and wages for each individual country, we use country specific 
CPI (with 2007 as base year) to obtain the real wage in local currency over time and then use 
2007 exchange rates to the U.S. dollar to standardize different currencies for cross-country 
comparison.  
Though every effort has been made to make the earnings across economies comparable, 
it should be born in mind that the reported earnings per month from both ILO LABORSTA   43
and UNIDO are represented by two revisions of International Standard Industrial 
Classification of all Economic Activities (ISIC) database, know as Revision 2 and Revision 
3. Different countries switch to the new standard of data collection at different times, and are 
from different surveys whose coverage may differ. Therefore, international comparison on 
earnings should be interpreted with caution.     
 
 
III. List of data files available upon request  
 
(a) Table A.1: Average Real Annual Wage of Staff and Workers by Ownership type (in 
2007 yuan) 
 
(b) Table A.2: Average Real Annual Provincial & Regional Real Wage per Staff and 
Worker (in 2007 yuan) 
 
(c) Table A.3: Average Real Annual Wage of Staff and Workers by Industry (in 2007 
yuan) 
 
(d) Table A.4: Manufacturing Earnings per Month per Person from ILO (in 2007 USD) 
 
(e) Table A.5: Manufacturing Earnings per Month per Person from UNIDO (in 2007 
USD) 
 
(f) Table A.6: Coverage of Data Surveys and the Time Periods under ISIC Rev-2 and 
ISIC Rev-3 
 